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We investigate the derivation of optimal interest rate rules in a simple stochastic framework. The 
monetary authority chooses to minimise an asymmetric loss function made up of the sum of squared 
components, where the monetary authority places positive weight on squared negative (positive) 
deviations of output (inflation) and zero weight on squared positive (negative) deviations. Recent 
approaches to monetary policy under asymmetric preferences have emphasised the adoption of a 
linear exponential (linex) preference structure. This paper presents a new and different analytic 
methodology that is based on the explicit calculation of semi-variances. This approach can be used to 
derive precise coefficients of the optimal interest rate rules. We derive optimal interest rate rules 
based on two different informational assumptions. In the first case, which we call a fixed interest rate 
rule, the monetary authority knows only the structure of the economy and the variance of sectoral 
shocks so that interest rates must take a constant value. In the second case, which we call a flexible 
interest rate rule, the monetary also has access to additional information in that it can observe the 
contemporaneous inflation rate. In this second case, we restrict our analysis to the class of linear 
interest rate rules. The more standard approach in the literature derives optimal monetary policy rules 
using symmetric loss functions, where monetary policy is designed to minimise the sum of squared 
components. We also compare optimal interest rate rules under both symmetric and asymmetric loss 
functions.  
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  Following from the seminal paper by Poole (1970), an extensive literature has 
developed which examines the properties of optimal money supply rules in economies 
that are faced with stochastic disturbances to different sectors.  Poole considered 
optimal money supply rules in a stochastic IS/LM framework.  Optimal money supply 
rules have also been derived in models with full market clearing when there is an 
asymmetry of information between the public and private sector; and when money 
supply responses are fully anticipated.  Studies for open economies tend to emphasise 
the relationship between monetary policy and exchange rate policy.  More recent 
work has emphasised the distinction between anticipated, unanticipated, permanent 
and temporary shocks and the relationship between wage indexation, lagged feed-
back rules, and monetary policy. 
  While this approach has become standard in the literature, even to the point of 
being adopted as one approach to monetary policy in the standard textbooks on 
monetary policy, standard monetary operating procedures adopted by central banks 
now tend to focus on a short-term interest rate as the primary instrument of monetary 
policy rather than the manipulation of monetary aggregates.  As a consequence, recent 
literature on monetary policy rules has tended to focus on interest rate rules rather 
than money supply rules (see Walsh, 1998, and Woodford, 2003).   
  All these approaches to monetary policy tend to assume that monetary policy 
rules are chosen so as to minimise a quadratic loss function, made up of a weighted 
sum of squared terms, typically including major macroeconomic indicators, such as 
output and inflation.  Such loss functions are characterised by symmetric properties, 
in that they give the same weight to positive and negative deviations about some 
chosen path.   
 2  In this paper we will focus on optimal interest rate rules that are chosen so as to 
minimise a loss function with asymmetric properties, that is, a loss function that gives 
different weights to positive a negative deviations from a chosen path.  Intuitively this 
makes sense because, for example, agents in the economy are more concerned about 
negative deviations in output (high unemployment) than they are about positive 
deviations (overfull employment) and they are more concerned about positive 
deviations of inflation from some desired path than they are about negative deviations.  
Recent studies (Nobay and Peel, 2003; Surico, 2007) make a compelling case that, in 
practice, policymakers are likely to adopt a loss function with asymmetric properties.   
  Aizenman and Frenkel (1985, Eq. A8, p. 420) show how the microfoundations 
for a loss function that has asymmetric properties can be developed.  Their results 
demonstrate that by expanding the production function in a Taylor series around the 
general equilibrium up to second-order terms the loss function will be symmetric; but 
by also including third-order terms of the Taylor expansion, an asymmetric loss 
function results. 
  Previous studies have used computer simulation techniques to examine the 
implications of asymmetric loss functions for the properties of optimal rules 
(Friedman, 1975; Kunstman, 1984).  Waud (1976) used analytic techniques to 
examine the properties of optimal responses under asymmetric criteria.  Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986) considered optimal monetary policy under an asymmetric 
criterion by considering the case when the policymaker's loss function comprised 
both quadratic and linear components.  Stemp (1993) calculated the semi-variance of 
a normally distributed variable and showed how these theoretical results could be 
used to calculate optimal money supply rules when preferences are asymmetric.   
 3Recent studies have focused on the specification of asymmetric preferences 
using a linear-exponential (linex) specification.  This approach to determining 
optimal monetary rules was first introduced in a theoretical framework by Nobay and 
Peel (2003).  Analysis of asymmetric preferences using the linex specification, or 
some generalisation of the linex specification, has also been employed in recent 
empirical studies of monetary policy (Ruge-Murcia, 2003; Surico, 2007; Boinet and 
Martin, 2008). 
The linex specification has the advantage that its theoretical distribution can be 
determined in a straightforward manner and that the quadratic distribution is nested 
within the linex specification as a special case.  This makes this specification 
particularly useful for the empirical testing for asymmetric preferences versus 
symmetric (quadratic) preferences.  It has the disadvantage that it only provides an 
approximation to any particular form of asymmetric preferences and cannot be used 
to precisely construct a loss structure that gives positive weight to squared positive 
(negative) deviations, but zero weight to squared negative (positive) deviations of a 
particular variable.  
This paper draws on ideas first presented in Stemp (1993) and subsequently 
extended further in Stemp (2009).  It is possible to use this approach to paste together 
different components comprising the semi-variances of particular variables (such as 
output and inflation).  The sum of zero weighted and different, but positive, weighted 
components to form a range of asymmetric loss functions more precisely reflects the 
objectives of a monetary authority that has truly one-sided targets.  As far as this 
author is aware, the approach to the construction of asymmetric preferences adopted 
in this paper has not been employed anywhere else, apart from the Stemp (1993, 
2009) papers. 
 4The rest of this paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 provides a formula for 
calculating the semi-variance components of an asymmetric loss function and shows 
how each of these components can be minimised by appropriate choice of mean and 
variance.  A diagrammatic approach to implement this calculation is introduced in 
Section 3.  A simple monetary model that will be used as the basis for analyses in the 
rest of the paper is introduced in Section 4.  This model is used in Section 5 to 
calculate optimal fixed interest rate rules under asymmetric preferences.  In Section 6, 
these results are compared with results under a symmetric loss function.  The model 
is used again in Sections 7, 8 and 9 to calculate optimal interest rate rules when the 
interest rate rule also depends on contemporaneous shocks. Comparisons are also 
made in these sections with the interest rate rules under the standard symmetric 
(quadratic) preference structure.  Concluding comments are provided in Section 10. 
 
2.  COMPONENTS OF AN ASYMMETRIC LOSS FUNCTION 
  Assume that X is a normally distributed random variable with mean,µ , and 
variance, 
2 σ .  We will write this as:
2 (, ) XN µ σ : .  We then define two random 
variables,  X
+  and  X
−, as follows: 

















Define  () F z  as the cumulative distribution function for a variable which is normally 
distributed with mean of zero and variance equal to 1, so that: 
 5  ()
2 1
Pr( ) exp . 2 2
z
y Z zF z d y
π −∞
 − <= = 
 ∫      (2) 
It then follows from Stemp (1993, Appendix), as further developed in Stemp (2009), 
that: 
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If we define the function, () H z , as follows: 
  () ( )
2 2 () 1 () e x p 2 2
z Hz z Fz
π
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z     (4) 
Then equations (3a, 3b) can be rewritten as:  
  () () { }
2 2 EX Hµ σ σ
+ =        (5a) 
  () () { }
2 2 EX H µ σ σ
− − =        ( 5 b )  
Equations (5a, 5b), when written in this form, have the useful property that they are 
separable in the two arguments, µ
σ   and 




+ and  are both always positive valued or zero and so have a minimum 






Note, from equation (4), that  ( ) 0 Hz→
2 0 σ >
, as  .  As a consequence, it is 
straightforward to show that, for  ,  
z →− ∞




σ →− ∞       ( 6 a )  




σ →+ ∞       ( 6 b )  
Essentially, equations (6a, 6b) tell us that, if we wish to minimise the positive part of 
the variable, X, this can be achieved by driving the mean of X as far away from any 
positive value as possible.  Similarly, if we wish to minimise the negative part of the 
variable, X, this can be achieved by driving the mean of X as far away from any 
negative value as possible.   
It also follows that, as  , 
2 0 σ → ( ) H µ
σ < ∞, whenever  0 µ ≤ .  As a consequence, it 
is straightforward to show that, as  , 
2 0 σ →
  , whenever  ()
2
0 EX
+ → 0 µ ≤       ( 7 a )  
  , whenever  ()
2
0 EX
− → 0 µ ≥       ( 7 b )  
In particular, whenever 0 µ =  and  , the expectations terms,  and 
, simultaneously approach zero. 








As  , the whole of the value taken by the variable, X,  is concentrated at its 
mean, 
2 0 σ →






, if  >0
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0, if  0
lim








=  < 
       ( 8 b )  
Essentially, equations (7a, 7b and 8a, 8b) tell us that, if we wish to minimise the 
positive part of the variable, X, as  , this can be achieved by 
2 0 σ → µ  taking a value 
that is in the non-positive part of X.  Similarly, if we wish to minimise the negative 
part of the variable, X, as  , this can be achieved by 
2 0 σ → µ  taking a value that is in 
the non-negative part of X. 
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3.  USING DIAGRAMS TO MINIMISE COMPONENTS 
In this section, we present a methodology for minimising  using a 
diagrammatic approach.  Our approach will then be employed later in the paper.  We 
begin by first establishing properties of the function, 
() Hz
( ) Hz. 
  ()
2
1 exp 2 2
z
y Fz d y
π −∞
 − =     ∫            ( 9 a )  
Hence, 
  () ( )
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π
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     ( 9 b )  
So that  
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π
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     ( 9 c )  
Since 
  () ( )
2 2 () 1 () e x p 2 2
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π
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
 
   () ( )
2 1( ) z zF z z Fz =+ +       ( 1 0 a )  
It follows that 
  () () ( )
2 (1 ) 2 zz Hz zFz z F z =+ +  
     ( ) ( )
22 2 1 exp exp 22 22
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ππ
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          ( 1 0 b )  
   ( )
2 ( 1 ) () 2 () () zz zFz z F z Fz z Fz =+ + + −
2
z     (10c) 
   () 2( )2 z F zz F z =+ .        ( 1 0 d )  
Also, 
 8  () () ( ) 2( ) zz zz z Hz F zF zz F z =+ +           ( 1 0 e )  
   () ( ) ( ) 2 z zF z F z zF z =− + + z          ( 1 0 f )  
   () 2F z =         (10g) 
From Equation (10g), since  , for all finite values of z, it follows that the 
function   satisfies the second-order conditions for a minimum.  From Equation 
(10d), the first-order conditions for a minimum are satisfied when 
() 0 Fz>
() Hz
  .       ( 1 1 )   () () 2( )2 0 zz Hz F z z F z =+ =
 (Figure 1A about here) 
Figure 1 plots  ( ) z Hz .  On the basis of the plot we can determine that the function 
achieves a minimum value when equation (11) is satisfied, that is when 
.  Since
() Hz
z →− ∞ ( ) () { }
2 2 Hz EX σ
+ = , where  z µ
σ =  we can assert that, for fixed 
variance,   takes its minimum value when  ( EX)
2 + µ →− ∞. 
  A similar methodology can be used, for fixed variance, to choose µ  so as to 
minimise  .  Note that  ()
2
EX
− ( ) () { }
2 2 EX H z σ
− =− , where z µ
σ = .  Thus, in order 





, for fixed variance, we need to find the 
value of z that minimises  .  For fixed variance,  ( H − ( ) Hz −  is minimised when  
           ( 1 2 a )   () 0 z Hz −− =
Or equivalently, when 
           (12b)  () 0 z Hz −=
 9Note that the plot of   is the mirror image of    when rotated through the 
" " axis.  Similarly, the plot of 
( ) Hz − ( ) Hz
0 z = ( ) z Hz −  is the mirror image of    when 
rotated through the " " axis.   
() z Hz
0 z =
(Figure 1B about here) 
Figure 1 plots  ( ) z Hz − .  As above and on the basis of the plot we can determine that 
the function  achieves a minimum value when  .  As a consequence, 
we can assert that, for fixed variance, 




−  takes its minimum value when 
µ →+ ∞. 
 
4.  A SIMPLE MONETARY MODEL 
  Our purpose in presenting the results of Sections 2 and 3 was to use those 
results as components of an asymmetric loss functions.  To this end, we consider a 
simple model of the following form: 
  yp u α =+            ( 1 3 a )  
  yr v β =− +            (13b) 
  01 rp γ γ =+              ( 1 3 c )  
where 
  y = real output (expressed in deviations about some target level); 
  p = inflation (expressed in deviations about some target level); 
  r = nominal interest rate; 
, uv are independent normally distributed variables, both with mean zero and 
with respective variances given by 
22 , uv σ σ . 
  , α β  are exogenously fixed constants; 
  01 , γ γ  are parameters chosen to minimise a suitable loss function. 
 
 10  Equation (13a) defines the supply-side of the economy through a Phillips 
curve relationship.  Equation (13b) defines the demand-side of the economy through a 
simple cut-down specification of an IS curve.  Equation (13c) defines a simple interest 
rate rule. 
  The model can be solved to give solutions for   as follows:  , yp
  1
0
11 () () () yu βγ αβ α γ αβ γ αβ γ αβ γ
   =− + +    ++    1






() () () 1
p u β γ αβ γ αβ γ αβ γ
   =− − +    ++ +   
v  

   (14b) 
 
Next, we define: 
          ( 1 5 a )  
, if y<0







          (15b) 
p, if p>0





We will choose an interest rate rule (given by some variant of Equation 13c) to 
minimise an asymmetric loss function of the following form: 
  () ( )
22
(1 ) A LE y E p δδ
−+ =+ − , where 01 δ < < .    (16) 
 
  We consider two types of interest rate rules:   
 
•  A fixed interest rule of the form: 
  0 r γ =            ( 1 7 a )  
This rule assumes that the setter of interest rates (the central bank) has access to 
the structure of the economy, given by Equations (13a-13c, 15a-15b and 16) 
 11and the mean and variance of contemporaneous shocks, but does not have 
access to any additional information.  The optimal rule is derived by 
fixing 1 0 γ = , keeping  0 γ  as a choice parameter in Equations (13a, 13b), and 
choosing  0 γ  so as to minimise Equation (16).   
 
•  A flexible interest rate rule of the form: 
  01 rp γ γ =+            (17b) 
This rule assumes that, in addition to the information available for the fixed 
interest rate rule, the central bank also has access to the contemporaneous 
value of inflation, p.  An interest rate rule that is non-linear would do better 
than the linear rule considered here.  However, as we wish to compare our 
results with those derived under the standard Poole (1970) methodology 
based on symmetric loss functions and also in order to keep the analysis 
tractable, we will restrict our analysis to the linear rule given by Equation 
(17b).  The optimal rule is derived by keeping both  0 γ  and  1 γ  as choice 
parameters in Equations (14a, 14b), and choosing  01 , γ γ  so as to minimise 
Equation (16). 
 
  We consider the implications of each of these rule types in turn. 
 
5.  OPTIMAL POLICY UNDER A FIXED INTEREST RATE RULE 
  Under the type of fixed interest rate rule considered here, the monetary 
authority is unable to influence the impact of stochastic shocks in the economy and 
can only influence the means of  .  , yp
 12Then 
2 (,) yy yN µ σ :  and 
2 (, pp pN ) µ σ :  where 
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σ σ      ( 1 9 a )  
Case of positive demand-side shocks (   ≥
22
uv σ 0,σ >0)
  We first focus on the case when there are positive demand shocks ( ).  
Equation (19a) can be reduced to: 
2 0 v σ >
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          (19b)   
Choosing  0 γ  to minimise Equation (19b) is equivalent to choosing z to minimise: 
  () () ( )
22 (1 ) Jz Hz H z α θδ δ θ =+ − − ,     ( 1 9 c )  
  where  () 0
v








Taking first derivatives of   with respect to z yields the first-order condition:  () Jz
  () ( )
2
11 (1 ) Hz H z α θδ δ θ =− −      ( 2 0 )  
This also satisfies appropriate second-order conditions for a minimum. 
We define: 
 13         ( 2 1 a )   () (
2
1 ;, gz H z δθ αθ δ = )
)   () ( 1 ;, ( 1 ) hz H z δ θδ =− − θ
)
       (21b) 
Figure 1 shows plots of  ( ;, gz δ θ  and  ( ) ;, hz δ θ  and illustrate how these curves 
adjust as the parameters, δ  and θ , are allowed to vary.   
(Figure 2 about here) 
It will be observed that  ( ;, gz ) δ θ  moves upward as δ  and/or θ  increase.  Similarly, 
( ;, hz ) δ θ  moves downwards as δ  and/or θ  increase.  From Equations (20, 21a, 
21b), observe that the minimum occurs at the intersection of these two curves.  Thus, 
as δ  and/or θ  increase, the value of z (and hence of  0 γ ) becomes smaller.  Since the 
two curves can be plotted numerically, the graphical methodology described here can 
be used to derive precise numerical values for 0 γ , limited only by the constraints 
imposed by machine precision.  The following special cases arise: 
  0  ( z ) γ =+ ∞ =+ ∞ , when  0 δ =       ( 2 2 a )  







      (22b) 
  0  ( z ) γ =− ∞ =− ∞ , when  1 δ =       ( 2 2 c )  
 
Intuitive justification of results 
  The polar cases for δ  coincide with the cases where the policy maker is 
focused solely on minimising  ( )
2
Ep
+ , when  0 δ = ; and focused solely on 
minimising  , when  ()
2
Ey
− 1 δ = .  Thus, a highly contractionary monetary policy is 
appropriate when  0 δ = ; and a highly expansionary monetary policy is appropriate 
 14when  1 δ = .  This is consistent with the results given from Figure 1 and by Equations 
(22a, 22c). 
0 γ
  The polar cases for θ  are demonstrated in Figures 3A and 3B.  Figure 3A 
illustrates the case when there is primarily a supply-side shock, so that  0 θ → .  Figure 
2B illustrates the case when there is primarily a demand-side shock, so that  1 θ → .  
For simplicity, assume that, in each diagram, ( )
2
Ep
+ , which can be loosely aligned 
with the aggregate shock above  , is equal to 1.  Then, from Figures 3A and 3B, 
for any given value of 
'
11 LL
0 γ , it will be observed that  ( )
2
Ey
− , which can be loosely 
aligned with the aggregate shock to the left of  , is less for the supply shock than 
it is for the demand shock.   
'
22 LL
(Figures 3A and 3B about here) 
  Thus, for a given value of δ , if we let 
*
0 γ  be the optimal value of  0 γ  under a 
supply-side shock, then, under a demand-side shock, 
*
0 γ  will be associated with too 
high a value for  .  We can correct this by reducing the value of  and 
increasing the value of  ; that is, by increasing the expected value of y.  This 









.  Thus, as θ  increases, the optimal choice of  0 γ  will be reduced.  This is 
consistent with the results derived from Figure 1. 
 
Case when there are supply-side shocks, but  no demand-side shocks (  
22
uv σ >0, σ =0)
  In the case where  , so that 
2 0 v σ = 0 θ = , the above analysis needs to be 
modified as follows.   
 15Let  () 0
u
z βγ
σ = .  Then, firstly,  ( ; , ) gzδ θ should be replaced with: 
         ( 2 3 a )  
*
2
0, if  0
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=  >  0
Secondly, ( ; , ) hzδ θ  should be replaced with: 
         (23b)  (
*
1 (; ) ( 1 ) hz H z δδ =− − )
 (Figure 4 about here) 
The optimal value of  0 γ  can then be derived using Figure 4.  Once again, the optimal 
value of z, and hence of  0 γ , is determined by the intersection of the two curves.  The 
following special cases arise: 
  0  ( z ) γ =+ ∞ =+ ∞ , when  0 δ =       ( 2 4 a )  
  0 0 ( 0) z γ −∞ < ≤ −∞ < < , when  1 δ =      (24b) 
The results when  0 θ =  can be interpreted as limiting cases of the results when  0 θ >  
and, as such, are consistent with the intuitive justification of results provided above. 
 
6.  COMPARISON WITH OPTIMAL RULE UNDER A 
 SYMMETRIC LOSS FUNCTION 
  It is informative to compare the results derived above under an asymmetric 
function with those derived under the more commonly used symmetric quadratic loss 
function.  In this section we examine optimal interest rules derived under the 
following symmetric loss function: 
         ( 2 5 a )   () ()
2 (1 ) S LE y E p δδ =+ −
2
) When 
2 (, yy yN µ σ :  and 
2 (, pp pN ) µ σ : , this loss function can be rewritten as: 
() ( )
22 22 (1 ) Sy y p L p δ µσ δ µσ =+ + − +       (25b) 
This can be rewritten as: 
 1622 2 (1 ) (1 ) Sy p y L
2
p δµδ µ δ σδ σ   =+ − ++ −         ( 2 5 c )  
  The results derived under the symmetric loss function are standard in the 
literature and, in this case, are given by the following: 
 
Under the fixed interest rule, the optimal interest rate rule under a symmetric loss 
function is given by: 
•  , irrespective of the relative magnitude of the shocks    (26)  0 r =
The optimal fixed interest rate rule is one where  0 γ  is chosen so as to drive  y µ  and 
p µ  to zero and  1 γ  is not a parameter of choice but rather fixed at zero.   
 
Under the flexible interest rate rule, the optimal interest rate rule under a symmetric 
loss function is given by: 
•  1 rp γ =  where  0 0 γ =  and  1 γ  is a function of 
22 ,, uv σ σδ  as well as other 
parameters  in  the  economy.       (27) 
 
The optimal flexible interest rate rule is one where  0 γ  is chosen so as to drive  y µ  and 
p µ  to zero and  1 γ  is chosen so as to minimise 
22 ) yp (1 δσδ +−σ . 
 
  It will be observed that, for a symmetric loss function, under both types of 
interest rate rule it is optimal to drive  y µ  and  p µ  to zero.  For our analyses, this is 
equivalent to requiring that the optimal value of z is zero.  This is not the case for the 





.  Thus, in general for a fixed interest 
rate rule, the optimal  0 γ  will not drive  y µ  and  p µ  to zero and the optimal interest rate 
rule under an asymmetric loss function is generally different to that under a symmetric 
 17loss function.  Comparison of results for the fixed interest rate rule are summarised in 
Table 1. 
(Table 1 about here) 
  Similarly, we will show below that, under a flexible interest rate rule, in 
general, the optimal value of z is non-zero.  But there are significant exceptions. 
 
7.  APPROACH UNDER A FLEXIBLE INTEREST RATE RULE 
  Under the flexible interest rate rule considered here, the monetary authority is 
able to influence the impact of stochastic shocks in the economy and so can influence 
both the means and variances of .  To aid in tractability, we restrict our analysis to 
the class of linear interest rate rules defined by Equation (17b).   
, yp
Then 
2 (,) yy yN µ σ :  and 
2 (, pp pN ) µ σ :  where 
  0
1 () y
αβ µ γ αβ γ
 =− + 
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      (28b) 
  0
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σ σ      ( 2 9 a )  
 18Choosing  0 γ  and  1 γ  to minimise Equation (29a) is equivalent to choosing z (thus 
determining  0 γ ) and making consistent choices of θ  and  1 γ  (thus determining  1 γ ) so 
as to minimise:   
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βγ σ α σ
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σ σ
 +  =
+
   (29c)   
For the flexible interest rate rule, we will first consider the two special cases when the 
shocks come from only one sector at a time. 
 
8.  FLEXIBLE INTEREST RATE RULE: SHOCKS TO ONE SECTOR 
 AT A TIME 
 
Demand-side shock only (  
22
uv σ =0,σ >0)




σ = .  Then, Equation (29b) reduces to: 












 +− −  ==
+
  (30) 
This can be minimised by choosing  0 0 γ =  (0 ) z =  and letting  1 γ →∞.  This is 
equivalent to choosing an interest rate rule to ensure that the aggregate demand curve 
given by Equation (13b) is horizontal in p-y space where p is on the vertical axis and y 
is on the horizontal axis.  Since any demand-side shock will just move the aggregate 
demand curve to the right or left, thus the aggregate demand curve remains unchanged 
by a demand-side shock and so both output and inflation will be unchanged by such a 
shock.   
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Supply-side shock only(  
22
uv σ >0,σ =0)
In this case, note that  1 θ βγ =  and  0
u
z βγ
σ = .  Equation (26b) then reduces to  












α βγ δ δ βγ
θγ γ
α βγ
  +− −     ==
+
 
          ( 3 1 )  
We next apply the first-order conditions for a minimum.  Firstly, setting  0 J
z
∂ = ∂  
ensures that: 
  ( 11 1
1
(1 ) z H α αβγ δ δ βγ
 =− − 





 ∂ =  ∂ 
 ensures that: 











α ββ γ δ βγ β γ αβ γ α βγ
   −  +  + + 
 
 





















2( 1 ) z HH z α βα β γ δ δ βγ
α βγ




    (33b) 
Note that  () 0 H ≠  and  () 1 0 H 0 ≠ .  Hence, using Equations (32, 33b) it is 
straightforward to show by substitution that the first-order necessary conditions are 
satisfied when the following two equations are satisfied simultaneously: 
 20            ( 3 4 a )   0 z =
  ( 1 1 ) αβγ δ δ =−        (34b) 
Thus the parameters of the optimal rule are given by: 
  0 0 γ =           ( 3 5 a )  
  ()
1
1 δ γ αβδ
− =         (35b) 
And the optimal flexible interest rate rule when there is only a supply-side shock can 
be written as 
  1 rp γ =  where  ()
1
1 δ γ αβδ
− =       ( 3 6 )  
 
Comparison with results under symmetric loss function 
  In the case when there are demand-side shocks only , the 
symmetric loss function reduces to: 














      ( 3 7 )  
Thus, the optimal rule under a symmetric loss function is given by letting  1 γ →∞, or 
equivalently by allowing the interest rate to vary so as to ensure: 
 0           ( 3 8 )   p =
This is also the optimal rule under the asymmetric loss function. 
  The case when there are supply-side shocks only   shows that 
these are not the only situations when rules are identical under symmetric and 
asymmetric loss functions.  As given by Equations (35a, 35b) the parameters of the 
optimal flexible interest rate rule under an asymmetric loss function are given by: 
22 (0 , uv σσ >= 0 )
  0 0 γ =           ( 3 9 a )  
 21  ()
1
1 δ γ αβδ
− =         (39b) 







δσ δ σ +−
=        ( 4 0 )  
Hence, the optimal rule, given by Equations (39a, 39b), chooses  0 γ  so as to drive  y µ  
and  p µ  to zero and chooses  1 γ  so as to minimise 
2 (1 ) y
2
p δσδ +−σ .  Thus, this rule also 
minimises the symmetric loss function given by: 
  () ( )
22 22 (1 ) Sy y p L p δ µσ δ µσ =+ + − +       ( 4 1 )  
The optimal flexible interest rate rule, when there are supply-side shocks only, is 
therefore identical under both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions.   
(Table 2 about here) 
  Comparison of results for the flexible interest rate rule when shocks come 
from only one sector are summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
9.  FLEXIBLE INTEREST RATE RULE: SIMULTANEOUS SHOCKS 
 TO BOTH SECTORS 
 
1
Simultaneous output and inflation targeting (0   < δ <1)
  We will now consider the general case when there are simultaneous demand-
side and supply-side shocks and 0 δ < < .   We now apply the first-order conditions 
to Equations (29b, 29c) to establish necessary conditions for an interior minimum.  
Firstly, setting  0 J
z = ∂
∂  ensures that: 
  () ( ) 1 (1 ) Hz Hz αθδ α θ δ =− − 1       ( 4 2 )  
Secondly, noting that θ  is a function of  1 γ  and setting: 






  ∂∂ +   ∂∂  
=         ( 4 3 a )  
ensures that: 










θ α θδ θ γ β θγ αβ γ α βγ

  −  +  + + 
 
  
















  (43b) 
When z equals zero, the third term of Equation (43b) is eliminated.  Hence, for what 
follows, we can focus on the first two terms of Equation (43b).  The first two terms of 













αβγ σ α σ β α δδ θ σσ αβ γ
   −  −− −     + +     
z  
          ( 4 3 c )  
Equation (43c) equals zero if  
  ()







αβγ σ α σ α δδ θ σσ
 −
) H z = −− 
+  
   (43d) 
Using Equations (42, 43d) it is straightforward to show by substitution that the first-
order necessary conditions are not simultaneously satisfied when 0 0 γ =  (0  and 
hence that the results under the asymmetric loss function are not the same as the 
results under the symmetric loss function.  We prove this by contradiction.   
) z =
  Once again, note that  ( ) 0 H 0 ≠  and  ( ) 1 0 H 0 ≠ .  Assume that the first-order 
necessary conditions satisfy 0 0 γ = z  (0 ) = .  Then, from Equations (42, 43c) the 
following two equations are satisfied simultaneously:   
 23 (1 ) αθδ δ =−          ( 4 4 a )  
  () () ( )
22 2 22
1 1 uv u v δ αβγ σ α σ δ σ σ −= −+      (44b) 















βγ σ α σ
θ
σσ
 +  =
  +  
     (45b) 
Hence, squaring both sides of Equation (45a),  
  () ( )
2 24 24 22 2 2 2
11 () 2 uv u v u v βγ σ α σ α βγ σ σ θ σ σ +− = +     (45c) 
     () ( )
2 22 222
1 uv u v βγσα σσσ  =++     (45d) 
Equation (44d) can be reduced to: 
          ( 4 5 e )   ()
2 22
1 0 uv αβ γ σ σ +=
But then, since   and  , it follows that: 
2 0 u σ >
2 0 v σ >
  1 0 α βγ +=          ( 4 5 f )  
Then, by substitution in Equation (44b),  
  θ α =           (45g) 
And by substitution in Equation (43a) 
 
2 (1 ) α δ =− δ          (45h) 
Then, given Equation (45h) and assuming  0 z = , the asymmetric loss function 
summarised by Equations (29a - 29c) reduces to: 









 +  =
+
      ( 4 6 )  
 24And, using Equation (45f), this diverges to +∞ whenever 01 δ < < .  Clearly, if 
1 γ →∞,   will take a finite value, so Equation (45h) is not consistent with a 
minimum.  This is a contradiction.  Hence, our initial assumption that   is not 
valid.  It follows that, when  ,   and 
A L
0 z =
2 0 u σ >
2 0 v σ > 01 δ < < , the optimal interest rate 
rules under the symmetric and asymmetric loss functions cannot be the same.   
  While we are not able to say more about the general case, we can cast further 
light on the two polar cases excluded from the above analysis: inflation targeting 
(when  0 δ = ) and output targeting (when  1 δ = ).   
 
Inflation targeting    (δ=0)
In this case, Equations (29b, 29c) reduce to: 
















          ( 4 7 )  
This can be minimised by choosing  0 0 γ =  (0 ) z =  and letting  1 γ →∞.  This is 
equivalent to choosing an interest rate rule to ensure that inflation is constantly 
maintained at  0 p = .  Such a rule will ensure that  ( )
2
0 Ep
+ = .  This is also the 
optimal rule under a symmetric loss function. 
 
Output targeting (   δ=1)
In this case, Equations (29b, 29c) reduces to: 













     ( 4 8 a )  















βγ σ α σ
θ
σσ
 +  =
  +  
 (48b) 
It is not possible to choose  1 γ  so that 
2
y σ  is driven to zero.  The optimal rule requires 
choosing an interest rate rule where  0 γ →− ∞( z →− ∞)
1
.  This is equivalent to 
choosing an interest rate rule that is highly expansionary.  Such a rule will ensure 





Comparison with results under symmetric loss function 
  In general, under a flexible interest rate rule and asymmetric loss function, the 
optimal value of z is non-zero.  Thus the optimal interest rate rule is different under 
symmetric and asymmetric loss functions.  This applies in those cases where 
 and 0
22 0, 0 uv σσ >> δ <≤ .  As shown above, exceptions arise in other cases: when 
0 δ =  and when shocks emanate in only one sector at a time. 
  As can be demonstrated using Equations (8a, 8b), one exception arises when it 
is possible to choose  1 γ  so that 
2
y δσ  and (1
2 ) p δ σ −  are simultaneously driven to zero.  
Thus the optimal flexible interest rate rule under inflation targeting ( 0) δ =  is given 
by   (consistent with  0 p = 1 γ →∞).  This rule drives 
2
p σ  to zero, resulting in identical 
rules for this case under both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions.   
   
10.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
  This paper has investigated the derivation of optimal interest rate rules in a 
simple stochastic framework where the monetary authority chooses to minimise an 
asymmetric loss function.  We have focused on deriving optimal interest rate rules 
based on two different informational assumptions.  In the first case, which we call a 
 26fixed interest rate rule, the monetary authority knows only the structure of the 
economy and the variance of sectoral shocks so that interest rates must take a constant 
value.  In the second case, which we call a flexible interest rate rule, the monetary also 
has access to additional information in that it can observe the contemporaneous 
inflation rate.  In this second case, we restrict our analysis to the class of linear 
interest rate rules.  The paper has presented an analytic methodology that could be 
used, in conjunction with computing techniques, to derive precise coefficients of the 
optimal interest rate rules in each of these cases.   
  While this paper has focused on deriving optimal interest rate rules under an 
asymmetric preference structure, the more standard approach, first developed by 
Poole (1970), derives optimal monetary policy rules using symmetric loss functions.  
Our analysis also compares optimal interest rate rules under both symmetric and 
asymmetric loss functions.   
  We have shown that, in general, the optimal rules derived under asymmetric 
loss functions will be different than the optimal rules derived under symmetric loss 
functions.  Under the fixed interest rate rule, the optimal rules differ.  However, under 
the flexible interest rate rule, it is possible to construct special cases where the optimal 
rules are the same.   
  The results of this paper could easily be extended in a variety of ways along 
the lines of extensions to the Poole (1970) literature.  For example, our simple 
monetary model could be extended to incorporate different informational assumptions 
and different expectations assumptions.  It would also be possible to consider 
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Minimising  A L  under Fixed Interest Rate Rule when  0 θ > ; 
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 31Figure 3A 
Fixed Interest Rate Rule:   
























Fixed Interest Rate Rule:   
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 32Figure 4 
Minimising  A L  under Fixed Interest Rate Rule when  0 θ = ; 
Following increase in δ , z  moves from   to  .  1 z 2 z
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Comparison of Optimal Fixed Interest Rate Rules under Symmetric and 
Asymmetric Loss Functions 
 
 















22 0, 0 uv σσ ≥>
 
( ) rf δ = , where 
( ) fδ δ 0 <  
(0) f = +∞ 
(1) f = −∞  
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Supply-Side 




22 0, 0 uv σσ >=
 
( ) rg δ = , where 
( ) gδ δ 0 <  
(0) g = +∞ 












Shocks to One Sector: Comparison of Optimal Flexible Interest Rate Rules 
under Symmetric and Asymmetric Loss Functions 
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0 p =  
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1 rp γ =   
where 
    0 0 γ =  
( )
1
1 δ γ αβδ
− =  
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